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In this paper we explore whether the constitutional text has any practical meaning for 
welfare policy. To examine the empirical importance of the constitution, we first 
constructed for 68 countries an index of constitutional commitment to social security 
in five areas: Old Age, disability and survivors (OASDI), Unemployment, Sickness, 
Work Injury and Income Support. We find that the extent and coverage of social 
security laws is not sensitive to the degree of constitutional commitment to social 
security. 
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Introduction 
The history of constitutional human rights is stratified into three generations. Civic 
rights such as the freedom of expression are perceived as the first generation, political 
rights such as the right to vote comprise the second generation, and social rights such 
as the right to live in dignity are the third generation. Most countries include the first 
two generations of rights in their constitution, but they differ significantly in the scope 
and degree of commitment to social rights. In some countries there is not even a 
mention of social rights in their constitutions.  
 
There is extensive literature on the consequences of electoral rules and forms of 
government as outlined in the constitution on economic policy outcomes. For 
example, Persson and Tabellini (2004) found that constitutional rules have a 
significant effect on key fiscal policy and corruption.
2 The implication is that the 
constitutional text has more than a declarative role in this regard. But does the 
constitution have any practical meaning when it comes to social rights? 
 
In a companion paper (Ben-Bassat and Dahan, 2003) we have constructed indices to 
assess the degree of constitutional commitment to five social rights (Social Security, 
Education, Health, Housing and Workers’ Rights). While we did not trace a robust 
and significant effect of constitutional commitment to education and health on 
education and health expenditures, we did find a positive relationship between the 
degree of constitutional commitment to social security and transfer payments (as a 
share of GDP). This finding is consistent with the claim that the constitution is more 
than a piece of paper in the sense that the constitutional text might be important for 
public policy. 
 
The positive association between constitutional commitment to social security and 
transfer payments motivated us to go a step further to examine the transmission 
mechanism. If the constitution does have an effect on welfare policy, this should 
emerge in the connection between the degree of commitment to social security in the 
constitution and the extent and coverage of social security laws. The importance of 
the constitutional text for policy is in question if it does not survive this test.  
                                                           
2 See Persson and Tabellini (2003) book for an excellent survey of the empirical evidence.    3
 
The goal of this paper is to explore whether the constitutional text regarding social 
security plays a role in shaping social security policy. Social security is one of the 
main pillars of the modern welfare state. In fact, social security expenditures account 
for a large chunk of government outlays in a typical developed country. The European 
average share of social security expenditure is 24.8% of GDP while the world average 
is 14.5% (ILO, 2000).  
 
Most social security programs are formulated as entitlements, and so it helps to 
quantify the extent and coverage of social security programs in a relatively 
meaningful way. Naturally, the constitutional commitment to a particular right must 
be examined in terms of the associated social security law. This makes room for a 
range of effects of constitutional commitment on various components of social 
security. For example, the constitutional commitment to Old Age, compared to 
Unemployment, may have a different effect on social security policy. This type of 
detailed examination provides a more stringent test of the importance of constitutional 
text on social policy.  
 
In the next section we present the criteria used to translate the constitutional text into 
quantitative indices that reflect the constitutional commitment to social security. In 
Section 3 we examine whether our indices are correlated with legal origins and 
religious beliefs. In Section 4 we look at the effect of constitutional text on the extent 
and coverage of social security laws. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Indices of Constitutional Commitment to Social Security 
In this section we construct constitutional indices of social security rights according to 
the constitutional text, and ignoring court interpretations. There is wide variability in 
constitutional social security rights, ranging from the U.S. and Australia, where social 
security rights are absent, to Switzerland and Brazil, which have a high constitutional 
commitment to social security. 
 
Our paper relates to 64 countries with a written constitution and four which have a 
legal document with a higher status than regular law. In Canada, New Zealand and   4
Israel there are basic laws which have a legal status similar to a constitution. England 
does not have basic laws, but it does have a Human Rights Act that has higher status 
than regular law.
3 Our two main sources are the English translation of the constitution 
in the ICL and Confinder web sites.
4  
 
A constitutional social right is defined here as one that grants a personal entitlement to 
monetary transfers (including social insurance). That right may affect permanent 
income and welfare. Those social rights provide a social safety net and would seem to 
have a positive impact on income equality, at least in the short run.  
 
There are five groups of social security rights in a constitution, and each of them may 
contain one or more features. The five rights are the following: 
1.  The three most basic features of social security as reflected in 
textbooks in Public Economics
 5 are: pension, disability and survivors 
(OASDI)  
2.  The right to live in dignity, usually expressed by income support to the 
poor 
3.  Unemployment insurance 
4.  Sickness insurance 
5.  Work injury insurance 
 
There is considerable variance between countries as regards the degree of 
constitutional commitment to social security rights, ranging from concrete policy 
action in some countries to a general statement reflecting a vague commitment in 
others. We rank the degree of constitutional commitment on a scale from 0 to 3, with  
a rank of 0 denoting a right that is absent from the constitution.  
 
A rank of 1 is given if the constitution includes a general statement with regard to a 
particular social security right. In that case it is clear that it is possible to introduce a 
                                                           
3  From Section 3 in the English Human Rights Act it can be inferred that ordinary laws are subject to 
the Human Rights Act. Any law should be examined in the light of the Human Rights Law. In case the 
suggested law is in contradiction to the Human Rights Act, the law may still be passed, provided the 
parliament is aware of this.  
4 International Constitutional Law http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law 
5 "This [OASDI] is usually referred to as social security and is intended to provide a basic standard of 
living to the old aged, the disabled, and their survivors." (Stigliz, 2000: page 353).   5
law concerning that right. A rank of 2 is given if the constitution guarantees a minimal 
level with respect to that right such as “a minimum standard of living,” or “a life of 
dignity,” in the case of income support and “adequate insurance” in the case of 
unemployment. A rank of 3 is given if the constitution has a high degree of 
commitment and concreteness. For example, a commitment “to maintain the real 
value” of social security benefits justifies a rank of 3. 
 
We use the two most common constitutional social security rights – the right to 
pension in old age and the right to unemployment insurance – to illustrate the ranking 
process. 
 
The right to old age, survivors and disability (OASDI) 
Each of the three features constituting the right to OASDI was ranked as shown in 
Table 1. The overall rank is a simple average across all three features. The most 
popular rights are old age pension (41 countries), and assistance to the disabled (39 
countries), while support to survivors is less frequent (28 countries).   
 
Table 1: Criteria for ranking the constitutional commitment to old age, survivors 
and disability (OASDI) 
 rank 
The right is absent from the constitution  0 
General statement 
The state “guarantees” or “promotes” social security insurance, or 
“every person is entitled to social security” 
1 
Weak commitment 
Old age, disabled and survivors are entitled to a “minimum standard 




In addition to the guarantee of “adequate income,” the constitution 
specifies the elements of what is adequate income in terms of food, 
housing etc., or a periodical adjustment mechanism such as COLA. 
3 
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We use the constitution of Switzerland as an example of a country that receives a rank 
of 3 as regards OASDI rights. To quote the Swiss constitution: “The confederation 
shall take measures for adequate social security for the elderly, survivors, and 
disabled persons. The insurance shall be mandatory. The pensions must cover basic 
living expenses appropriately. The maximal pension shall not exceed twice the 
minimal pension. The pension shall at least be adapted to the development of prices .” 
The key elements that are responsible for its high rank are: the insurance is 
mandatory, there are limits on minimal amounts and the pension is adjusted to prices. 
 
The constitution of Italy guarantees support just to two groups usually included in 
OSDAI  – the elderly and the disabled, as may be seen from the following quote: 
“Workers shall be entitled to adequate insurance for their needs in case of accident, 
illness, disability, old age, and involuntary unemployment.” The constitution assures 
that workers will receive adequate insurance, but it does not mention any further 
details such as periodical adjustment. Because of its weak commitment it gets a rank 
of 2 for each group covered, but since only two out of three potential groups are 
covered the overall rank is 1.333. 
 
India’s constitution contains a general statement concerning the two features of the 
right to OASDI; each of them earns a rank of 1, as is indicated by the following 
quote: “The state shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, 
make effective provision for securing the right to public assistance in cases of 
unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement.” 
 
The right to unemployment insurance 
The commitment to unemployment insurance is usually formulated along the same 
lines of other social security rights, such as old age pension and sickness insurance. In 
many constitutions they are even formulated as part of the same article, as shown for 
Italy and India in the previous section. Therefore, the unemployment insurance 
commitment was ranked by the same scale presented in Table 1. 
 
Brazil is an excellent example of a country that is strongly committed to 
unemployment insurance (rank: 3), as is indicated by the following quote: “The 
social security plans shall, upon contribution, pursuant to the law, provide protection   7
of workers who are involuntarily unemployed. Adjustment of the benefits is ensured 
so as to permanently maintain their real value according to criteria defined in the 
law.” 
 
The commitment of Hungary is weaker (rank: 2), as expressed in the following quote: 
“Citizens of the Republic of Hungary have the right to social security; they are 
entitled to the support required to live in old age, and in the case of sickness, 
disability, being widowed or orphaned and in the case of unemployment through no 
fault of their own.” Hungary grants entitled citizens “the support required to live,” but 
do not provide any extra element, such as a periodical price adjustment. 
 
A rank of 1 is given if the constitution includes a general statement with regard to 
unemployment insurance. A typical example appears in the constitution of Egypt – 
“All citizens have the right to pensions in cases of incapacity, unemployment, and old 
age, in accordance with the law.” It does not include any characteristic beyond a 
general statement and it is even more restricted in the sense that the translation of this 
right should be consistent with the (regular) law.  
 
The constitutional commitment to all social security rights were ranked according to 
these criteria, and the data set for each characteristic are presented in Table 1. 
 
 
3. Commitment to social security, traditions and religious beliefs  
 
The constitutional commitment to social security may be regarded as the core of the 
modern welfare state.  The right to social security appears in the constitution of 47 
countries with different levels of commitment. In half the countries, the rank value is 
less than 1 and the average is 0.56, reflecting a relatively low level of constitutional 
commitment. We found a high level of constitutional commitment in four countries: 
Brazil, Finland, Portugal and Switzerland. 
 
The constructed index of constitutional commitment to social security is composed of 
five features: Old Age (including survivors and disability), Unemployment, Sickness,   8
Work Injury and Income Support. The most prevalent social security right in the 
constitutions is Old Age, which appears in 43 countries, while Work Injury insurance 
appears only in 11 countries. 
 
3.1 CCSS and legal origins 
At first glance it is hard to find common economic, cultural or other characteristics 
among countries that share a similar degree of constitutional commitment to social 
security (Table 1). For example, the Scandinavian countries are spread all over the 
scale. Finland is closer to Latin-American countries, Sweden has the same 
constitutional commitment as South Korea, while Norway belongs to a group of 
countries in which social security is absent from the constitution. 
 
All of the countries in our sample were classified by legal origins, in accordance with 
the groups suggested by Reynolds and Flores (1989). The two main legal traditions 
are English common law and French civil law, derived from Roman law. We 
followed a series of studies showing the importance of legal origins for economic 
performance [La-Porta et al (1997, 1998, 1999), Glaeser and Shliefer (2002) and 
Botero et al (2004)].  
 
The concept underlying the Common Law tradition is to protect citizens from the 
power of government. It began to develop in the 17
th century, with the empowerment 
of the parliament and aristocracy at the expense of the monarchy, and concomitant 
greater constraints on the power of the king (Finer, 1997). In contrast, the civil law 
tradition, especially after codification in the 19
th century, gives the government more 
power to run the life of its citizens (Finer, 1997). There are three groups of countries 
that follow the civil law tradition—French, Scandinavian and German.  
 
In Eastern Europe the legal tradition is relatively new and its roots are in the former 
socialist pattern of the Soviet Union, which is far more centralized than civil law. 
Each country in our sample is classified into one of the five groups according to its 
legal tradition: English common law, French civil law, German, Scandinavian and 
socialist.  
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It is striking that seven out of the top ten countries ranked according to our summary 
index of constitutional commitment to social security are French civil law countries: 
Portugal, Italy and five Latin American countries (Table 2). This finding, with regard 
to Latin American countries, is surprising in light of the high level of income 
inequality in those countries. 
 
In contrast, no common law country is part of the top ten. According to our 
constitutional commitment index, there are 21 countries where all five social security 
rights are absent. Thirteen of those are common law countries, while only four are 
French civil law countries. 
 
In Table 3 we test the hypothesis that the constitutional commitment to social security 
rights is related to legal origins, controlling for level of development and propensity to 
democracy. All equations are estimated with OLS, where each social security right 
serves as a dependent variable at one time. We find that countries that are classified as 
French civil law have a much higher constitutional commitment to social security than 
do common law countries (the omitted variable), after controlling for GDP per capita 
and democracy. This is a highly significant result.  
 
This finding repeats itself for all five social security rights separately (Table 3). The 
coefficient reflects quite a large effect: The coefficient for the summary index of 
constitutional commitment to social security is around 0.61, where the sample mean 
of our index is 0.56. Countries belonging to the socialist tradition, Scandinavian or 
German legal origins do not express different constitutional commitment to social 
security as compared to common law countries. At first glance, it is somewhat 
surprising to find that French civil law countries have on average a higher 
constitutional commitment to social security than post-socialist countries. Most 
socialist countries are in transition to a market economy, however, and some of them 
have rewritten their constitutions in recent years. 
 
Given the fact that the top ten (or even twenty) countries are disproportionably 
populated by Latin American countries, it is natural to examine the results’ sensitivity 
to the inclusion of a dummy variable for Latin American countries. We found that in 
general the results are similar (Table 4). However, the introduction of a Latin   10
American dummy variable leads to a lower coefficient for French civil law countries, 
without a change in ordering: countries with a socialist tradition, Scandinavian or 
German legal origins are not statistically different from common law countries. 
 
3.2 CCSS and religious beliefs 
It is natural to examine whether the constitutional text is related to the religious 
beliefs of each society.
6 We use the shares of population that have Protestant, 
Catholic, Muslim and other beliefs as explanatory variables controlling for GDP per 
capita. Table 5 presents OLS regressions for each of the five constitutional 
commitments to social security features in addition to a summary index of social 
security. 
 
The picture that emerges here is much less clear than that regarding legal origins. In 
general we find that countries which have a higher share of population with Catholic 
beliefs tend to have higher constitutional commitment to social security as compared 
to Protestant (and other beliefs) countries. 
 
However, that effect is statistically significant only regarding sickness and work 
injury. The effect of Catholic beliefs for the other three social security rights is 
positive but insignificant. The Catholic coefficient is not significant at the standard 
level in the regression of our summary index of constitutional commitment to social 
security.  
 
The quantitative impact of Catholic beliefs is quite large, but only for those 
coefficients that are significant. In addition, the Catholic effect does not survive the 
inclusion of a dummy variable for Latin American countries (Table 6). In the case of 
the constitutional commitment to work injury, the Catholic coefficient becomes 
insignificant, and in the case of sickness the quantitative impact implied by the 
estimated coefficient is much less. 
 
 
                                                           
6  Note that there is some overlapping between legal origins and religious beliefs, and in 
particular between Catholic and French civil law. 
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4. Social security in the constitution and in practice 
 
The commitment to social security in the constitution might reflect social preferences 
but does not necessarily translate into government policy. Naturally, the constitution 
does not imply concrete policy actions, delineating a path for policy makers. There 
may, therefore, be a weak or even no relationship between constitutional commitment 
and welfare policy. 
 
This paper examines the empirical correlation between our indices of constitutional 
commitment to social security and the generosity implied in five features of social 
security laws. If the constitutional text with respect to social insurance has any 
practical meaning it should appear in the extent and coverage of social security laws. 
 
We should expect to have a positive correlation between welfare policy indicators and 
our index of constitutional commitment to social security if the constitutional text has 
any practical meaning. The danger of reverse causality arises in most studies using 
regression analysis. However, the risk of reverse causality is less likely in our case to 
the extent that constitutions reflect beliefs and values. While government policy may 
lead to changes in the constitution, this is rare. Values and beliefs may change over 
time, but this is a slow process that does not necessarily have an immediate impact on 
the constitution. 
 
Alternatively, no relations between the constitutional text and welfare policy may 
reflect the fact that the constitution has a solely declarative role. Various policies 
might be consistent with the same constitutional commitment to social security. 
Unlike civic and political rights, social security rights might be less binding because 
of the qualitative nature of these rights. 
 
No empirical relations could be also the result of the fact that public policy is shaped 
by social preferences which are not yet in the constitution, and may never be. In this 
case, we do not expect to find any relation between welfare policy and social security 
rights (which by construction equal zero), unless there is a systematic bias in the sense   12
that countries that are more welfare-state oriented tend to omit social security rights 
from their constitution. 
 
The last hypothesis—a somewhat cynical one—is that the constitutional text 
embodies the very opposite of the real beliefs that dictate welfare policy. In such 
regimes the constitution is merely of propaganda value. In this case we would expect 
to find a negative relation between constitutional commitment to social security and 
the extent of social insurance coverage. 
 
Before turning to regression analysis, Table 7 presents a simple matrix for four 
different features of social security: Old age, Unemployment, Work Injury and 
Sickness. The columns describe whether a particular feature exists in the constitution 
(regardless of its degree of commitment), and the rows represent whether that same 
feature appears in the regular laws as they are documented in Social Security 
Throughout the World 2004. 
 
Panels A and B of Table 7 show that Old Age (including survivors and disability) and 
Work Injury laws exist in all countries. Those countries that have not mentioned Old 
Age (25 countries in our sample) and Work Injury (57 countries in our sample) in 
their constitution still provide these social insurance features. This simple matrix 
implies that the lack of constitutional commitment to a certain social security feature 
is not translated to an absence of that particular feature from social security law. 
 
The other off-diagonal cells in four panels of Table 7 are even more interesting. They 
answer the question of whether there are countries that have expressed commitment to 
particular features of social security and yet do not provide coverage at all. We find 6 
such countries in the case of Unemployment and two countries in the case of 
Sickness. However, it is hard to draw conclusions from this finding due to data 
limitations. Unfortunately, the Social Security Throughout the World publication 
pooled together countries that do not have a particular feature of social security with 
countries for which the data is unavailable.  
  
Our focus here is to examine the effect of constitutional commitment to social 
security on welfare policy, controlling for a list of control variables that is standard in   13
this literature.
7 Our control variables are GDP per capita, the propensity to democracy 
and the share of the population over age 65.  
 
The data for GDP per capita is an average for 1990–1999, taken from the Penn World 
Tables for all countries except Taiwan. Income per capita serves as an indicator of the 
level of economic development, which may influence social preferences for public 
consumption (versus private consumption), as well as a more developed tax-collection 
system (‘Wagner’s law’). 
 
A large share of social security expenditure goes to the population over the age of 65. 
Hence, the average share of the population aged above 65 for 1990 –1999 is one of 





In this paper we provide two ways to examine the relationship between constitutional 
commitment to social security and welfare policy. In general, expenditures such as 
transfer payments are a complex combination of the extent of social security coverage 
as determined by social security laws and “exogenous variables” such as take-up rate, 
demographic composition and aggregate unemployment rate (in the case of 
unemployment expenditures). We first use the following econometric model to test 
the effect of constitutional commitment to social security: 
 
(i)  ε + + + = CCSS a Y a a TR 2 1 0 , 
 
where TR denotes government expenditures on actual transfer payments, Y is a vector 
of various control variables such as demographic composition, and CCSS stands for 
constitutional commitment to social security. 
 
The coefficient of CCSS captures the pure effect of social security laws to the extent 
that we control for exogenous variables, which is not always possible. In addition, this 
                                                           
7 For example, Rodrik (1998), Taveres and Wacziarg (2001) and Mulligan, Gil and Sala-i-Martin   14
type of econometric model assumes that transfer payments are a linear combination of 
social security laws and exogenous variables. 
 
Alternatively, we use a somewhat more direct way to estimate the effect of 
constitutional commitment to social security on the extent and coverage of social 
security laws: 
 
(ii) u CCSS Z LAWS 2 1 0 + β + β + β =  , 
 
where LAWS represents an index of the generosity of social security laws, Z is a 
vector of various control variables, and CCSS is as before. 
 
In an estimated model of type (ii) the empirical challenge is to construct a meaningful 
index that captures the extent and coverage of social security laws. Note that the 
generosity of social security laws may be related to the size of the eligible population. 
Social entitlements may be more generous with a larger eligible population because of 
political considerations through a median voter effect, or less generous due to budget 
considerations. 
 
Table 8 presents several regressions for various indices of the generosity of social 
security. In this first column we replicate the Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2003) 
regression, where a summary index of constitutional commitment to social security 
was found to be with a positive coefficient in the share of transfer payments in GDP. 
The estimated coefficient reflects a substantial quantitative effect. An increase of one 
standard deviation in the constitutional commitment to social security would induce a 
rise of 1.7 percentage points in the share of transfers in GDP if this correlation reflects 
a causal relationship.  
 
The effect of GDP per capita on transfer payments is positive (as expected by 
Wagner’s law), but it is significant only when the share of the population over age 65 
is not included. However, the positive effect of the elderly population on transfer 
payments is not sensitive to the inclusion of other variables, such as democracy. The 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(2002).   15
insignificant effect of democracy on social spending was found also in Mulligan, Gil 
and Sala-i-Martin (2002). 
 
Nevertheless, transfer payments as a proxy for the extent and coverage of social 
security suffers from two main limitations. First, transfer payments include social 
security expenditures in addition to other government transfers. Second, the issue of 
data availability makes it hard to control for all the relevant factors. It is important to 
the extent that the error term in a model of type (i) described above is correlated with 
the omitted variables. Third, the international institutions that collect and publish 
budgetary data are always careful to add footnotes regarding the limitations of 
comparing fiscal data across countries. In fact, we found large discrepancies between 
various sources in the data on social security expenditures or transfer payments.  
  
In column 2 (Table 8) we run a regression where the dependent variable is the 
contribution rate for all social security programs (taken from Social Security 
Throughout the World 2004). The contribution rate as an indicator for the extent and 
coverage of social security programs is more comparable across countries than 
transfer payments.  
 
Nonetheless, the limitation of that proxy is clear: social security benefits may be more 
generous than what is implied by the contribution rate in countries that have 
experienced long and substantial actuarial deficits. However, Mulligan and Sala-i-
Martin (2004) report on a relatively large correlation between the amount of revenue 
collected by payroll taxes and social security expenditures. We find, however, that the 
coefficient of constitutional commitment to social security becomes insignificant once 
we replace transfer payments with the contribution rate. 
 
In a recent paper, Botero et al (2004) constructed an index of social security coverage 
for 85 countries. We use their summary index of social security coverage instead of 
transfer payments as a proxy for social security coverage (52 countries exist both in 
their and our samples). Once again, the coefficient of constitutional commitment to 
social security turns out to be insignificant as in the case with the contribution rate. 
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The summary index of social security coverage by Botero et al (2004) is built on three 
different indices: Old Age (including survivors and disability), Unemployment and 
Sickness. It allows us to test our hypothesis more directly by regressing a particular 
constitutional commitment on its respective social security feature. As before, we find 
no empirical relation between constitutional commitment to social security and social 
security in practice in all three features separately: Old Age, Unemployment and 
Sickness (Table 9). In table 10 we go further to test the effect of constitutional 
commitment to Unemployment separately on four components of the extent and 
coverage of unemployment law as calculated by Botero et al (2004). The coefficients 





In this paper we have constructed for 68 countries five indices of constitutional 
commitments to social security rights: Old Age (including Survivors and Disability), 
Unemployment, Sickness, Work Injury and Income Support. The commitment to Old 
Age appears in the constitution of 43 countries while only 11 countries have a 
constitutional commitment to Work Injury. 
 
21 countries preferred not to include any social security right, but nevertheless in 
practice they do provide social security. In general, in countries that have social 
security rights in their constitutions the degree of commitment is relatively low; some 
countries lower it further by adding that those rights should be in accordance with the 
law. This may reflect the fear that constitutional commitment might undermine the 
flexibility of economic policy to adjust to environment changes such as 
macroeconomic fluctuations or preferences toward government involvement. 
  
We find that countries that share the tradition of French civil law generally have a 
higher constitutional commitment to social security than countries adhering to the 
English common law tradition. We have not found a clear and significant difference 
between German, Scandinavian or Socialist traditions and English common law 
tradition.   17
 
In a previous paper (Ben-Bassat and Dahan, 2003) we found a significant correlation 
between constitutional commitment to social security and transfer payments. If the 
constitution does have an effect on welfare policy it must show up in the connection 
between the degree of commitment to social security in the constitution and the extent 
and coverage of social security laws. In this paper we found no support for the effect 
of constitutional commitment to social security on social policy when using various 
measures of social security coverage in regular laws instead of transfer payments as 
an indicator for social policy. 
 
This finding may reflect the nature of constitutional social rights. The practical 
translation of constitutional civic rights such as the right to vote is clear. In contrast, 
the translation of social rights such as unemployment insurance may be expressed by 
various level of generosity. For example, the replacement rate and the period of 
entitlement may be different even for the same degree of constitutional commitment 
to unemployment insurance. 
   18














Albania   0.43  1  0  0  0  0.66 
Argentina   0.43  0  0  0  0 1.00 
Australia   0.00  0  0  0  0  0.00 
Austria   0.00  0  0  0  0  0.00 
Bahrain   0.71  0  1  1  0  1.00 
Belgium   0.43  0  0  0  0  1.00 
Bolivia   0.86  0  1  1  1  1.00 
Brazil   3.00  3  3  3  3  3.00 
Bulgaria   0.43 0  1  0  0  0.66 
Cameroon   0.00  0  0  0  0  0.00 
Canada   0.00  0  0  0  0  0.00 
Chile   0.43  1  0  0 0  0.66 
China   0.86  2  0  0  0  1.33 
Colombia   0.43  0  0  0  0  1.00 
Cyprus   0.86  0  0  0  0  2.00 
Czech 
Republic   0.00  0  0  0  0  0.00 
Denmark   0.14  1  0  0  0  0.00 
Dominican 
Republic   1.57  3  2  2  0  1.33 
Ecuador   1.29  2  0  1  1  1.66 
Egypt   0.43  0  1  0  0  0.66 
El Salvador   0.43  0  0  0  0  1.00 
Fiji   0.00  0  0  0  0  0.00 
Finland   2.14  3 3  0  0  3.00 
France   0.43  2  0  0  0  0.33 
Germany   0.00  0  0  0  0  0.00 
Greece   0.00  0 0  0  0  0.00 
Hungary   1.43  0  2  2  0  2.00 
Iceland   0.14  1  0  0  0  0.00 
India   0.57  1  1  1  0  0.66 
Indonesia   1.00  1  0  0  0  2.00 
Iran   0.71  0  1  0  1  1.00 
Ireland   0.43  0  0  0  0  1.00 
Israel   0.00  0  0  0  0  0.00 
Italy   1.71  2  2  2  2  1.33 
Japan   0.14  1  0  0  0  0.00 
Jordan   0.00  0  0  0  0  0.00 
Kenya   0.00  0  0  0  0  0.00 
Malta   0.86  1  1  1  1  0.66 
Mexico   0.86  0  1  1  1  1.00 
Nepal   0.43  0  0  0  0  1.00 
Netherlands   0.14  1  0  0  0  0.00 
New Zealand   0.00  0  0  0  0  0.00 
Nicaragua   1.86  3  2  0  2  2.00 
Norway   0.00  0  0  0  0  0.00 
Panama   1.14  0  2  1  1  1.33 
Paraguay   0.43  1  0  0  0 0.66 
Philippines   0.00  0  0  0  0  0.00 
Poland   0.57  1  0  1  0  0.66 
Portugal   2.00  2  2  2  0  2.66 
Romania   0.29  0  1  0  0  0.33 
Sierra Leone   0.29  0  0  0  0  0.66 
Singapore   0.00  0  0  0  0  0.00 
South Africa   0.86  3  0  0  0  1.00 
South Korea   0.43  0  0  0  0  1.00 
Spain   1.00  2  2  0  0  1.00 
Sri Lanka   0.00  0  0  0  0  0.00 
Sweden   0.43  0  0  0  0  1.00   19
Switzerland   2.14  1  3  1  1  3.00 
Syria   0.57  0  0  1 0  1.00 
Taiwan   0.43  0  0  0  0  0.66 
Thailand   0.00  0  0  0  0  0.00 
Trinidad   0.00  0  0  0  0  0.00 
Tunisia   0.43  0  0  0  0  1.00 
Turkey   0.29  0  0  0  0  1.00 
United 
Kingdom   0.00  0  0  0  0  0.00 
United states   0.00  0  0  0  0  0.00 
Uruguay   1.71  0  2  2  2  2.00 
Zambia   0.00  0  0  0  0  0.00 
Mean  0.56 0.57  0.5  0.33 0.23  0.78 
Standard 



















































Table 2: Constitutional commitment to social security and legal origins 
















1 Brazil  F  3.00    35 Paraguay F  0.43 
2 Finland  SD  2.14    36 Chile F  0.43 
3 Switzerland  G  2.14    37 France F  0.43 
4 Portugal  F  2.00    38 Colombia F  0.43 
5 Nicaragua  F  1.86    39 Sweden SD  0.43 
6 Uruguay  F  1.71    40 Tunisia E    0.43 
7 Italy  F  1.71    41 Turkey F  0.29 
8 
Dominican 
Republic F  1.57 
 
42 Sierra Leone  E  0.29 
9 Hungary  S  1.43    43 Romania S  0.29 
10 Ecuador  F  1.29    44 Iceland SD  0.14 
11 Panama  F  1.14    45 Denmark SD  0.14 
12 Indonesia  F  1.00    46 Netherlands F  0.14 
13 Spain  F  1.00    47 Japan G  0.14 
14 Bolivia  F  0.86    48 Austria G  0.00 
15 South  Africa  E  0.86    49 Australia E  0.00 
16 Malta  F  0.86    50 United states  E  0.00 




Kingdom  E 0.00 
18 China  S  0.86    52 Germany G  0.00 
19 Cyprus  E  0.86    53 Zambia E  0.00 
20 Iran  F  0.71    54 Trinidad E  0.00 
21 Bahrain  E  0.71    55 Greece F  0.00 
22 India  E  0.57    56 Jordan F  0.00 
23 Syria  F  0.57    57 Israel E  0.00 
24 Poland  S  0.57    58 Norway SD  0.00 
25 Ireland  E  0.43    59 New Zealand  E  0.00 
26 El  Salvador  F  0.43    60 Singapore E  0.00 
27 Albania  S  0.43    61 Sri Lanka  E  0.00 
28 Argentina  F  0.43    62 Fiji E  0.00 
29 Bulgaria  S  0.43    63 Philippines F 0.00 




Republic  S 0.00 
31 South  Korea  G  0.43    65 Cameroon F 0.00 
32 Taiwan  G  0.43    66 Canada E  0.00 
33 Egypt  F  0.43    67 Kenya E  0.00 















Table 3: Legal origins and constitutional commitment to social security 














Average of Old 
Age, Disability 








(0.740)  (0.680)  (0.110)  (0.040)  (0.601) 
 
             
-0.058  -0.101  -0.051  -0.031  -0.019  -0.114  Log GDP 
Per-Capita 
(-0.490)  (-0.950)  (-0.340)  (-0.250)  (-0.120)  (-0.650)   
             
0.271  0.407  0.055  0.385  0.328  0.567   
Democracy  
(0.840)  (1.400)  (0.130)  (1.130)  (0.750)  (1.200)   
             
0.612ª  0.521ª  0.648ª  0.497ª  0.669ª  0.643ª  French 
(3.390)  (3.200)  (2.800)  (2.610)  (2.710)  (2.264)   
             
0.334  -0.030  0.403  0.313  0.460  0.342  Socialist 
(1.210)  (-0.120)  (1.140)  (1.070)  (1.220)  (0.850)   
             
0.313  0.199  0.447  0.028  0.432  0.176  German 
(0.950)  (0.670)  (1.060)  (0.080)  (0.960)  (0.370)   
             
0.336  -0.007  0.448  -0.182  0.422  0.765  Scandinavian 
(1.01)  (-0.02)  (1.050)  (-0.520)  (0.930)  (1.570)   
             
0.084  0.117  0.029  0.059  0.032  0.037  Adj. R
2 
67  67  67  67  67  67  Number of 
Observations 
The t statistics are reported in the parentheses.  
a. Significance at 1% 
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Table 4: Legal origins and constitutional commitment to social security 
With Latin American dummy 




(5)  (4)  (3)  (2)  (1) 
 















0.060  -0.154  -0.246  0.217  -0.335  0.783  Constant 
(0.060)  (-0.200)  (-0.240)  (0.180)  (-0.260)  (0.550)   
             
0.010  0.008  0.019  0.033  0.034  -0.110  Log GDP 
Per-Capita 
(0.090)  (0.080)  (0.150)  (0.210)  (0.200)  (-0.600)   
             
0.093  0.123  0.255  -0.164  0.187  0.557   
Democracy  
(0.280)  (0.450)  (0.720)  (-0.390)  (0.410)  (1.130)   
             
0.430




b  French 
(2.140)  (1.360)  (1.690)  (1.640)  (1.870)  (2.100)   
             
0.351  -0.003  0.326  0.423  0.473  0.343  Socialist 
(1.300)  (-0.020)  (1.120)  (1.220)  (1.250)  (0.840)   
             
0.285  0.154  0.008  0.412  0.410  0.175  German 
(0.880)  (0.570)  (0.020)  (0.990)  (0.910)  (0.360)   
             
0.310  -0.050  -0.201  0.415  0.401  0.764  Scandinavian 
(0.950)  (-0.180)  (-0.580)  (0.990)  (0.880)  (1.560)   
             
0.480
b  0.766ª  0.351  0.592
c  0.380  0.025   Latin America 
(1.930)  (3.680)  (1.320)  (1.860)  (1.100)  (0.070)   
0.120  0.269  0.070  0.067  0.035  0.020  Adj. R
2 
67  67  67  67  67  67  Number of 
Observations 
   The t statistics are reported in the parentheses.  
a. Significance at 1%;   b. Significance at 5%;    c. Significance at 10%.    
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Table 5: Religious beliefs and constitutional commitment to social security 




(5)  (4)  (3)  (2)  (1) 
 
 














0.736  0.403  0.889  -0.019  0.755  1.487  Constant 
(0.770)  (0.460)  (0.720)  (-0.020)  (0.580)  (1.080)   
             
-0.031  -0.045  -0.031  -0.006  -0.023  -0.062  Log GDP 
Per-Capita 
(-0.340)  (-0.550)  (-0.270)  (-0.070)  (-0.190)  (-0.480)   
             
0.534  0.646
b  0.005  0.904
a  0.493  0.043   
Catholic 
(1.551)  (2.060)  (1.230)  (2.563)  (1.061)  (0.087)   
             
-0.001  0.111  0.002  0.325  -0.169  -0.987
c  Muslim 
(-0.003)  (0.302)  (0.550)  (0.788)  (-0.311)  (-1.708)   
             
-0.291  -0.049  -0.002  0.102  -0.527  -0.750  Other 
(-0.763)  (-0.140)  (-0.520)  (0.261)  (-1.022)  (-1.369)   
0.110  0.113  0.039  0.134  0.080  0.070  Adj.R² 
64  64  64  64  64  64  Number of 
observations 
The t statistics are reported in the parentheses.  
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Table 6: Religious beliefs and constitutional commitment to social security 
With Latin American dummy 




(5)  (4)  (3)  (2)  (1) 
 
 














0.368  -0.301  0.449  -0.231  0.375  1.521  Constant 
(0.380)  (-0.380)  (0.360)  (-0.230)  (0.290)  (1.070)   
             
0.009  0.032  0.017  0.017  0.018  -0.066  Log GDP 
Per-Capita 
(0.100)  (0.420)  (0.140)  (0.180)  (0.140)  (-0.490)   
             
0.003  0.002  0.003  0.008
b  0.003  0.001   
Catholic 
(0.910)  (0.850)  (0.650)  (2.100)  (0.570)  (0.120)   
             
0.0003  0.001  0.003  0.003  -0.001  -0.009
c  Muslim 
(0.090)  (-0.550)  (0.640)  (0.840)  (-0.250)  (-1.700)   
             
-0.003  0.0001  -0.002  0.001  -0.005  -0.007  Other 
(-0.690)  (0.04)  (-0.450)  (0.310)  (-0.960)  (-1.360)   
             
0.481
c  0.922ª  0.572
c  0.276  0.496  -0.043  Latin America 
(1.790)  (4.170)  (1.640)  (0.980)  (1.350)  (-0.110)   
0.142  0.306  0.066  0.133  0.095  0.056  Adj.R² 
64  64  64  64  64  64  Number of 
observations 
The t statistics are reported in the parentheses.  
a. Significance at 1%;   b. Significance at 5%;    c. Significance at 10%.    
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Table 7: A simple matrix of social security laws and constitutional rights 
 
Panel A: Old Age, Disability and Survivors (number of countries) 
Social Security Law   
Constitutional Right  Yes No 
Total 
Yes 43  0  43 
No 25  0 25 
Total  68 0  68 
 
 
Panel B: Unemployment (number of countries) 
Social Security Law   
Constitutional Right  Yes No 
Total 
Yes 14  6* 20 
No 33  15  48 
Total  47 21  68 




Panel C: Work Injury (number of countries) 
Social Security Law   
Constitutional Right  Yes No 
Total 
Yes 11  0  11 
No 57  0 57 




Panel D: Sickness (number of countries) 
Social Security Law   
Constitutional Right  Yes No 
Total 
Yes 13  2* 15 
No 42  11  53 
Total  55 13  68 
* The two countries are Syria and Bahrain.   26
Table 8: Generosity of social security laws and constitutional commitment to 
social security  






















-0.312  40.790ª  56.870ª  -2.423  Constant 
(-1.190)  (3.090)  (3.140)  (-0.340)   
         
0.089ª  -4.061
b  -5.733ª  -0.284  Log GDP 
Per-Capita 
(2.650)  (-2.370)  (-2.430)  (-0.310)   
         
0.011
c  1.327ª  2.159ª  1.592ª   
Population 65+ 
(1.870)  (3.880)  (4.590)  (8.780)   
         
0.034    2.145  2.750ª  CCSS 
Summary Index  
(1.330)    (1.000)  (3.330)   
         
  2.228
c     
CCSS 
Old age, Disability 
and Survivors 
  (1.770)       
0.489  0.204  0.261  0.758  Adj.R² 
52  66  66  65  Number of 
Observations 
  The t statistics are reported in the parentheses.  
a. Significance at 1%;   b. Significance at 5%;    c. Significance at 10%.    
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 Table 9: Generosity of social security laws and constitutional commitment to 
social security  
 (6)  (5)  (4)  (3)  (2)  (1)   














Health   Unemployment    
-0.656ª  -0.171  0.173  -0.193  -0.178  0.639ª  Constant 
(-3.420)  (-1.010)  (-1.020)  (-1.130)  (-0.570)  (2.840)   
             
0.139ª  0.086ª  0.086ª  0.087ª  0.095ª  0.014  Log GDP 
Per-Capita 
(6.680)  (4.710)  (4.690)  (4.730)  (2.820)  (0.590)   
             
          0.005  CCSS 
Unemployment 
          (0.320)   
             
        0.056    CCSS 
Sickness 
        (1.360)     
             
      0.005      CCSS 
Old Age 
      (0.350)       
             
    -0.007       
CCSS 
 Old Age, 
Survivors, 
Disability 
    (-0.390)         
             
0.037  -0.014          CCSS 
Summary Index  
(1.390)  (-0.610)           
0.463  0.289  0.286  0.285  0.121  -0.043  Adj. R
2 
52  52  52  52  52  39  Number of 
Observations 
  The t statistics are reported in the parentheses.  
a. Significance at 1%;   b. Significance at 5%;    c. Significance at 10%.    
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Table 10: Generosity of unemployment law and constitutional commitment to 
unemployment insurance 
 (5)  (4)  (3)  (2)  (1)   

















Percentage of the 
net salary covered 
by the net 
unemployment in 








0.359  1.575ª  0.331  -0.255  0.639ª  Constant 
(0.990)  (3.520)  (0.610)  (-0.420)  (2.840)   
           
0.058  -0.079
c  0.059  0.071  0.014  Log GDP 
Per-Capita 
(1.540)  (-1.690)  (1.040)  (1.120)  (0.590)   
           
-0.038  0.011  -0.016  0.074
c  0.005 
CCSS 
Unemployment 
(1.520)  (0.380)  (-0.420)  (1.880)  (0.320)   
           
0.077  0.028  -0.017  0.064  -0.043  Adj. R
2 
39  39  39  36  39  Number of 
Observations 
The t statistics are reported in the parentheses.  
a. Significance at 1%;   b. Significance at 5%;    c. Significance at 10%.    
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Table 11: Generosity of social security laws and transfer payments expenditures 
(Dependent variable - the share of transfer payments in GDP) 
)  6 (   ) 5 (   ) 4 (   ) 3 (   ) 2 (   ) 1 (    
-2.925
b -3.030
b -2.145 -1.609 -0.681 3.114 Constant
(-2.350) (-2.170) (-0.880) ) -0.540 ( ) -0.130 ( )  0.460 (
1.588ª 1.551ª 1.680ª 1.643 ª ª 1.635 1.628 ª Population 65+





















0.719 0.718 0.727 0.727 0.718 0.622 Adj     ² R
65 65 51 51 47 39 ber of Num
Observations
The t statistics are reported in the parentheses  
a. Significance at 1%;   b. Significance at 5%;    c. Significance at 10%.    
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